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RECENT DECISIONS
STATE FINANCE -Special Fund Doctrine- Special Fund
Doctrine applicable if source of revenues reasonably sufficient
for payment of State Capital Improvement Bonds, a prior pledge
of the revenues notwithstanding. Mims v. McNair (S.C. 1969).
In 1968, the General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing
the issuance of State Capital Improvement Bonds.' Revenues
from the State Income Tax, as well as the full faith and credit
and the taxing power of the state, were pledged to secure pay-
ment of the bonds. 2 The appellants sought to enjoin issuance of
the bonds by invoking article X, section 11 of the South Caro-
lina Constitution,3 which requires referendum approval by two-
thirds of the electorate before the General Assembly can incur
bonded indebtedness against the state other than for the ordi-
nary and current expenses of the state. The respondents main-
tained that this section was not controlling, and asserted the legis-
lature's lawful exercise of power to pass such an act under the
Special Fund Doctrine. The appellants, however, contended
that the Special Fund Doctrine was inapplicable
since [it could] not be extended to cover the issuance of
bonds as provided [in the Act] because (a) the revenue
from the income tax is subject to a prior pledge for other
bonds, (b) the revenue is subject to future pledges for
additional bonds pursuant to future legislation, and (c)
the coverage of the special fund is not adequately pro-
tected.
4
1. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 3175 (No. 1377, 1968). Some of the projects
to be funded included the Medical College at Charleston, the S.C. State Col-
lege, the S.C, Mental Health Commission, the Tri-Centennial celebration and
others; the issuance was limited to an amount not exceeding $70,000,000.
2. LV S.C. STATs. AT LARGE 3180 (No. 1377, 1968).
3. S.C. CoNST., art. X, § 11, Public Debt; State Bonds provides:
To the end that the public debt of South Carolina may not here-
after be increased without the due consideration and free consent
of the people of the State, the General Assembly is hereby for-
bidden to create any further debt or obligation, either by the loan
of the credit of the State, by guaranty, endorsement or otherwise,
except for the ordinary and current business of the State, without
first submitting the question as to the creation of such new debt,
guaranty, endorsement or loan of its credit to the qualified electors
of this State at a general State election; and unless two-thirds of
the qualified electors of this State, voting on the question, shall be
in favor of increasing the debt, guaranty, endorsement or loan of
its credit, none shall be extended ....
4. Brief for Appellants at 5, Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E,2d 355
(1969).
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The circuit court, in upholding the position of the respondents
and the bond legislation, stated that in previous South Carolina
decisions,
[t]he sole question has been the sufficiency of the fund
provided in order to pay off the principal and interest
on the bonds to which they have been pledged, without
resort being made to ad valorem property taxes.6
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Special Fund Doctrine is ap-
plicable, despite a prior pledge of particular revenues for other
debts, if the source of the revenues is reasonably sufficient for
payment of the new indebtedness. Mims v. cNair, 252 S.C. 64,
165 S.E.2d 355 (1969).
The Special Fund Doctrine arose in many states out of a desire
to circumvent state constitutional limits placed on legislatures
regarding the creation of public debt without consent of the
electorate. Only eight states place no limits on legislative discre-
tion in incurring state debts. Twenty states require approval of
the electorate through referendum, and twenty others require
electorate authorization through a constitutional amendment. 6
Circumvention of popular approval is accomplished by paying
for new obligations from a so-called "special fund" established
from an existing source of state revenues. The obligations cre-
ated are not considered "debts" which would violate constitutional
restrictions.7
At least two other devices are used by state and local govern-
ments to avoid constitutional limitations on debt creation: an
"executory contract" theory and a "special district" theory. In
the former, current expenses such as salaries or services, although
contractually incurred obligations, escape constitutional restric-
tions if charged to a valid appropriation not in excess of pro-
jected current revenues. In some jurisdictions the contracts can
be multi-year. However, only current expenses and not capital
expenditures fall within this exception. A "special district" is a
new government unit added to a municipality, such as a special
park or a drainage district, when the municipality reaches its per-
missible debt limit. The result is a separate corporation whose
5. 252 S.C. at 76, 165 S.E.2d at 361, quoting the circuit court order.
6. Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities:
The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YAE L.J. 234, 240-241, 242
(1958). There were only forty-eight states at the time of publication of this
article.
7. Id. at 242.
19701. o1
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debts are not charged to the municipality. It either has the same
constitutional debt limit as the municipality, or is wholly exempt
from debt limits. Thus, a municipality's borrowing power within
constitutional limitations is at least doubled.8
As early as 1890 in Indiana, Quill 'v. lndianapolis9 held that
assessments collected on certain properties would constitute a spe-
cial fund from which bonds issued for street improvements could
be paid. Since the bonds were payable from a special fund, they
were said to create no debt against the city.
In State ex rel. Rikhards v. Moorer,10 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court adopted the Special Fund Doctrine. The issue as
the court saw it was the meaning of "debt" and "indebtedness" in
sections 7 and 11 of article X of the State Constitution." Citing
an earlier case, 12 the court found that constitutional limitations
on legislative creation of state debts were for the protection of
the taxpayer from excessive and continual taxation. So long as
an existing "special fund" of revenues was sufficient to pay for
new obligations without additional taxes, the new obligations did
not require approval by a referendum as provided for in the state
constitution.13
Two subsequent cases, State ex rel. Roddey v. Byrnes"4 and
Arthur v. Byrneslr relied on in the Mimes opinion, were based on
the established Riehards doctrine. In fact, in Arthur, the court
summarily accepted the Special Fund Doctrine and concerned it-
self merely with the sufficiency of the fund."6
In Mims, the court again was not concerned with the validity
of the doctrine, but with the appellants' contentions of its inap-
plicability. The court concluded that the appellants' first conten-
tion concerning the prior pledge of the income tax receipts in pre-
8. Id.
9. 124 Ind. 292, 23 N.E. 788 (1890).
10. 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E. 269 (1929).
11. Id. at 491, 150 S.E. at 281.
12. Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153 (1926).
13. Id. at 301, 135 S.E. at 157.
14. 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 33 (1951). General obligation bonds were issued
to finance construction of school buildings and related facilities. To pay the
principal and interest of the bonds, revenues were pledged from a sales tax
created in the same legislation.
15. 224 S.C. 51, 77 S.E.2d 311 (1953). The act authorized a maximum issu-
ance of $14,000,000 worth of bonds for improvements and construction at vari-
ous state colleges. Principal and interest were to be paid from a fund made up
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vious legislation was not material.17 On the question of the
fund's sufficiency, the court stated that the pledge of funds in
Richards also had been a subordinate pledge.18 In contrast, the
appellants maintained that they had
not discovered any case in South Carolina in the series
of cases involving the application of the Special Fund
Doctrine whereby revenue from any source [had] been
pledged to the repayment of bonds where the same source
of revenue was then also subject to a prior pledge for the
repayment of other obligations.19
The apparent impasse may be resolved by noting that all of the
pledges involved in Richards were included in the same legisla-
tion, which had then provided for specific priorities among these
obligations as a safeguard in the use of the fund.20 In Mins,
however, the state income tax revenues as a payment fund had
been previously pledged exclusively for the payment of State
Ports Bonds, pursuant to 1956 legislation.21 In Edwards v.
Osborne,22 a not entirely dissimilar attempt had been made to
divert funds from highway purposes to pay for state general ex-
penses and a General Fund deficit. The court there recognized a
need to honor the prior pledge of the special fund for highway
purposes and would not allow its diversion. Thus, the present
case, though not mentioning Edwards, departs from this earlier
holding. The state income tax revenues in issue here were also
pledged by prior legislation; yet now the court was not adverse
to the legislative diversion of the pledged funds to other projects.
This 1956 legislation also failed to provide priorities to safeguard
against subordinate pledges of these revenues in subsequent enact-
ments.
Section 3 (g) of the State Capital Improvement Bond Act, at
issue in appellants' second contention, permits future issuance of
bonds for unspecified purposes as the General Assembly sees fit.23
17. 252 S.C. at 76, 165 S.E.2d at 361.
18. Id. Later discussion of the legislation in Richards will explain the court's
statement
19. Brief for Appellant at 12, Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355
(1969).
20. XXXVI S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 670 (No. 297, 1929).
21. XLIX S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2007 (No. 821, 1956).
22. 195 S.C. 295, 11 S.E2d 260 (1940).
23. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 3175, 3178 (No. 1377, 1968) provides:
[W]hose proceeds shall be applied: . . . (g) such other purposes
as the General Assembly may from time to time specify, either by
acts amendatory to this act, or by special statutes declaring that
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The legislative acts in question in Richards, Roddey, and Arthur
reveal no like clause, and in fact, issuance of bonds pursuant to
these enactments was confined to purposes specifically set out
within each act.24 Though in earlier special fund cases, the max-
imum debt ceiling of the original legislation had been subse-
quently raised,25 the General Assembly was never given such
broad authority to use special fund revenues in issuing bonds for
any future project which it deemed worthy.
In claiming inadequate protection of the special fund, the ap-
pellants did not claim that the revenues derived from state in-
come taxes were inadequate. The language of the Bond Act pro-
vided, as a measure for adequate protection to the bond holders,
that revenues derived from the State Income Tax should exceed
150% of the maximum annual principal and interest require-
ments of all outstanding State Ports Bonds and State Capital
Improvement Bonds, and all such bonds later to be outstanding."
This 150% coverage for present and projected principal and in-
terest requirements of the bonds helps prevent an overextension
of revenues which might make deficit financing necessary.
Rather, the appellants maintained that the 150% coverage of the
bonds was not protected from later legislative reduction.27 This
conclusion was argued by the appellants noting that, on the face
of the act, only State Ports Bonds and State Capital Improve-
ment Bonds need be taken into account now when computing
150% coverage.28 Therefore, they reasoned, if income tax rev-
enues were subsequently pledged to additional commitments, de-
spite coverage being met with regard to Ports and Improvement
bonds, the effect would be a dilution of overall coverage below
150% when all claims on the income tax revenues were considered.
In resolving this point, the court ruled that subsequent pledges
of income tax revenues would
have to be taken into account to determine the suffi-
ciency of the state income tax at the time for the pay-
ment of the State Capital Improvement Bonds then to
be issued. The pledge to such other obligation, of course,
24. See XXXVI S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 670 (No. 297, 1929) ; XLVII S.C.
STATS. AT LARGE 546 (No. 379, 1951) ; XLVIII S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 169 (No.
139, 1953).
25. Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C. at 74, 165 S.E2d at 360 (1969).
26. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 3175, 3181 (No. 1377, 1968).
27. Brief for Appellants at 16-17, Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E2d
355 (1969).
28. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 3175, 3181 (No. 1377, 1968).
[Vol. 22
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would be subordinate to the pledge prescribed by the
Bond Act for the payment of any outstanding State
Capital Improvement Bonds.
29
This conclusion was based on the respondents' allegation of an
implied covenant with the holders of the State Capital Improve-
ment Bonds that the 150% coverage would be maintained and
that any pledge to pay subsequent bond enactments would be
subordinate to State Capital Improvement Bonds.80
As has been noted, this case bears marked differences from
some of the cases which earlier shaped South Carolina's Special
Fund Doctrine. More significantly, the court has here extended
the doctrine to encompass a new approach by the General As-
sembly to fiscal problems. Heretofore, fiscal needs have been at-
tacked in piecemeal fashion by passing legislation which was nar-
row in scope and limited in application. Now, however,
[iut is clear from a reading of the Bond Act that it is in-
tended as a statutory vehicle of general application for
the issuance of general obligation bonds by the State of
South Carolina to replace numerous special statutes.31
This change in policy reflected in Mims represents a more real-
istic approach by the General Assembly to the needs of state
financing since it allows broader legislation through which the
General Assembly can attack a wider range of problems. None-
theless, if the state wishes to alleviate the need for circumvention
of its constitution, a more straightforward solution would be to
recognize the inadequacy of the present constitution in this area.
The objective should be to restore to the General Assembly a
measure of trust for the financial stability of the state in express
terms in a new constitution,32 or in the alternative, to change in-
dividually the restrictions existing in the present constitution.
S. JAcKso: KIMBALL, III
29. 252 S.C. at 75, 165 S.E.2d at 361.
30. Brief for Respondents at 14; Mines v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d
355 (1969).
31. Id. at 13. (emphasis added).
32. Among the current proposals for constitutional revision is a recom-
mendation that referendum approval by the electorate be eliminated in the area
of bonded indebtedness and that the General Assembly be allowed to determine
such fiscal needs. COMM. TO MAxE A STUDY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA COX-
STITUTION OF 1895, FINAL REPORT OF THE Comm. To MAxE A STUDY OF THE
SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION OF 1895 at 80-81 (1969).
1970]
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COPYRIGHT-Infringement of Performance Rights - Plain-
tiffs denied recovery for copyright infringement when their
agent failed to provide defendant with reasonable assistance in
avoiding infringement. Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers (4th Cir.
1969).
Myers, a night club owner in North Carolina, was approached
by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) with an offer to sell a license to play all music copy-
righted by its member music companies. Myers concluded that
the license was too expensive and rejected the offer. However, he
offered to refrain from playing any ASCAP tunes if ASCAP
would send him a list of all the copyrighted songs covered by the
license. Although ASCAP was under a 1950 consent judgment'
requiring it to publish and make available upon request informa-
tion of its copyrighted songs, it failed to supply Myers with such
information. Subsequently, when a band in Myers' club played
four copyrighted songs, the ASCAP member companies sued
Myers for infringement. The complaint sought both injunctive
relief and damages. The United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina held that there had been an in-
fringement and awarded the music companies $250 in damages
for each song, court costs, and counsel fees. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that although
there had been an infringement, ASCAP's failure to comply with
a E9550 consent judgment requiring assistance to those seeking to
avoid infringement caused the music companies to come into
court with "unclean hands" and consequently barred recovery.
Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1969).
1. ASCAP's control over most of the music companies in the United States
and the many charges against it of anti-trust violations led the United States
to institute a suit against ASCAP in 1940 for alleged violations of the Sher-
man and Clayton Anti-trust laws, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7. See United States v.
ASCAP, 11 F.R.D. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The result of that suit was a con-
sent judgment, the relevant section of which provides:
XIV. Immediately following entry of this Judgment, defendant
ASCAP shall upon written request from any prospective user
inform such user whether any compositions specified in such request
are in the ASCAP repertory, and make available for public in-
spection such information as to the ASCAP repertory as it has.
Defendant ASCAP is furthermore ordered and directed to prepare
within two years, and to maintain and keep current and make
available for inspection during regular office hours, a list of all
musical compositions in the ASCAP repertory, which list will show
the title, date of copyright and the author, composer and current
publisher of each composition.
[V7ol. 2
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Performance rights in music first came under protection of
statute in England in 1842.2 This legislation proved unsatis-
factory since, by buying up the performance rights to many songs
and refusing to divulge their titles, unscrupulous promoters were
able to prey upon unsuspecting singers and require them to pay
the statutory penalty.3 Parliament responded to public outrage
against this practice with the Copyright Acts of 18824 and 1888.5
These acts allowed the courts to determine the damages in each
case in lieu of a fixed statutory penalty. The acts also added a
requirement that the claim of protected performance rights be
stamped on each music sheet. Finally in 1911, copyright and per-
formance rights were merged. 6
In the United States, recognition of performance rights in
music was somewhat belated. Congress was granted the power
under the United States Constitution7 to promote the "useful
arts" by granting to writers the exclusive use of their works for a
limited time period. Composers of music, however, were not
granted this protection until 1831,8 but even then, the act only
protected the printing, reproducing, and publishing of musical
compositions. Composers, therefore, had to wait until 1897 for
statutory protection of the performance rights of their copy-
righted music. Anyone who publicly performed any copyrighted
music without the consent of the owner was held liable for dam-
ages and could be enjoined from further performance under this
act.9 Final major development of copyright law in the United
States occurred when legislation in 190910 repealed all prior copy-
right laws. The present copyright laws were substantially derived
from the 1909 act and were codified in 1947 in Title 17 of the
United States Code.1
Today, performance rights are fully protected by 17 U.S.C. §
1(e). By its terms, any person holding a music copyright has the
"exclusive right ... [t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly
2. Copyright Act of 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c.45, § 20. A mandatory penalty of
forty shillings was imposed for each violation under § 21 of this act. This
section extended to musical works this remedy which had been originally
imposed by the Dramatic Compositions Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Will., c.15, § 2.
3. A. SCHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 277 (1939).
4. Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vict, c.40.
5. Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act of 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c.17, § 1.
6. Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo.5, c.46, §§ 1,24, sched. 1. See also A.
SCHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 278 (1939).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art 1, § 8.
8. Act of February 3, 1831, c.16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.
9. Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat 481.
10. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat 1075.
11. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652.
1970]
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for profit .... ." A further provision allows for both injunctive
relief and damages for infringement of these performing rights.12
One restriction on a claim of copyright and performance rights
is that adequate notice of the copyright must be placed on the
sheet music.13 The purpose of this notice is to prevent innocent
persons from using the copyrighted music and incurring infringe-
ment penalties. 14 It is obvious that Congress sought to prevent
any fraud similar to that prevalent in England in the nineteenth
century.
Courts have generally construed copyright laws so that intent
to infringe upon a copyrighted work is not needed to find liabil-
ity for such infringement.1 Extensive litigation involving the
statutory phrase "public performance for profit"'16 has estab-
lished the liability of a night club proprietor for copyright in-
fringement by hired musicians, even when the musicians are class-
ified as independent contractors.1' Thus, when one hires an orch-
estra, he need not choose the music or have actual knowledge of
the music played to be liable for infringement.' This rule has
been generally upheld because of a principal-agent relationship
of the employer and employee under these circumstances. For
example, in N. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co.,'2 an
organist who had been instructed by her employer not to play
copyright music disregarded the instructions and played a copy-
righted piece for 17 seconds to accompany a silent movie. Her
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
13. Id. §§ 10,19,20.
14. 18 Am. JuR. Copyright & Literary Property § 58 (1965). See also
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947); Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 F. 247 (2d Cir.
1915).
15. E.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); M.
Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 F. 470 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd
2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924); Bourne v. Fouche, 238 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C.
1965). A distinction should be made between the lack of intent to infringe and
the presence of an intent nwt to infringe. A lack of intent to infringe is no
defense, while an intent to avoid infringement now may be an important
defense. See Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503,507 (4th Cir. 1969).
16. E.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931) (radio
broadcast is a public performance) ; M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amuse-
ment Co., 298 F. 470 (E.D.S.C.), affd 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924) (organist's
accompaniment to a silent movie was a public performance). See generally A.
ScAFA .R, MusIcAL COPYRIGHT 281-286 (1939).
17. See Bourne v. Fouche, 238 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
18. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
19. 298 F. 470 (E.D.S.C.), afj'd 2 F2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1924). See also
Bourne v. Fouche, 238 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C. 1965). Note that both this case
and Pastime Amusement Co. were in a district court in South Carolina; the
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employer was held liable on the theory that infringement was a
tort and the torts of an agent are imputed to his principal.
One of the most effective defenses employed in suits for in-
fringement is that a plaintiff has "unclean hands".20 Most courts
have not allowed a defendant to allege this defense, however, un-
less the defendant's rights were directly affected by the acts pur-
ported to have resulted in "unclean hands".21 Thus, in Leo Feist,
Inc. V. Young,22 ASCAIP's failure to comply with a Wisconsin
licensing statute did not bar its suit against a defendant who had
infringed on the plaintiff's copyright since the licensing statute
was designed to protect the public generally. It was further
stated that to bar the plaintiff's recovery would be to condone
the confiscation of his property rights, which would be uncon-
scionable.
In Tempo 1J'iJ 0 ,23 the court of appeals accepted without dis-
cussion the lower court's finding of an infringement. Thus, the
only question before the court was whether the infringement
should be excused. While ASCAP had no duty necessarily to sup-
ply Myers with a complete list in view of its unwieldy size,
ASCAP did have a duty to provide some alternative aid. Other-
wise, Myers could choose only between paying the fee or playing
no music at all.24 Once Myers expressed an intention to avoid in-
fringement, ASCAP had the burden of facilitating such avoid-
ance. This resulted because the consent judgment under which
ASCAP should have been operating provided for aiding persons
like Myers.2 5 Since the defendant's rights were directly affected
by ASCAP's inaction, the "unclean hands" doctrine was avail-
able to him. The court stated further that "equitable estoppel"
was applicable in law as well as in equity to deny recovery for
damages here.28 Therefore, all relief was denied to the plaintiffs.
20. When a suit for infringement of a copyright prays for injunctive relief,
it is equitable in nature; the equitable doctrine of clean hands applies, so that
a plaintiff's conduct must be above reproof before he can recover. See Withol
v. Crow, 199 F.Supp. 682 (D.Iowa 1961), rev'd on other grounds 309 F2d 777
(8th Cir. 1962). "Where only damages are sought, an infringement suit is
brought at law. However, equitable estoppel applies both in law and equity to
deny a party the right to plead and prove an otherwise important fact-here,
the act of infringement-because of something he has done or omitted to do."
Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503,507 n.8 (4th Cir. 1969).
21. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943); Bentley v.
Tibbals, 223 F. 247 (2d Cir. 1915).
22. 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1943).
23. 407 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1969).
24. Id. at 506.
25. See note 1, stepra.
26. See note 19, supira.
1970]
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Even though ASCAP had informed bandleaders that they
could determine whose copyright a song bore by examining the
sheet music, the court found that this was not adequate compli-
ance with the consent judgment.27 The court noted that this in-
formation was not forwarded to night club owners; since band-
leaders are seldom sued, they often feel little obligation to make
the necessary check of sheet music.
28
Upon considering "the relative sophistication of the parties
with respect to copyright" 0 laws, the court felt that the defend-
ant had made the best possible effort to avoid infringement. Since
the purpose of copyright notice is to reasonably inform, the court
took the position that adequate copyright notice was not pro-
vided by ASCAP. Adequate copyright notice to this court would
apparently be provided only after ASCAP had taken every rea-
sonable step to help potential users of its music avoid infringe-
ment. Providing information of its copyrighted music to a poten-
tial user upon request seemed to be the most reasonable step.80
Copyright laws have been established in the United States to
protect property rights in art, literature, and music. However, as
this decision revealed, these property rights are not absolute.
When a copyright holder is under a duty to take reasonable steps
to help the defendant avoid such infringement, he must take such
steps or be denied the right to sue for infringement.
The importance of this case is in its use to counsel night-club
owners or copyright holders. In the light of this decision, night
club owners are obliged to make some effort to avoid infringe-
ment, either by submitting a list of songs to be checked against
the copyright holder's master list or by requiring that their band-
leaders check sheet music for notice. Once this is done, there is
less danger that copyrighted songs will be illegally played, or
that a night club owner will be faced with an infringement action.
Copyright holders, on the other hand, should be alert to the
fact that they may have to go beyond the bare statutory require-
ments of notice, irrespective of the presence of a consent judg-
ment. This will certainly include the checking of submitted lists
of songs against their master list. Other reasonable forms of aid
may also be required.
JAMEs B. PAsLAY
27. Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 506-7 n.6 (4th Cir. 1969).
28. Id.
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EVIDENCE - Prior Inconsistent Statements - Prior inconsis-
tent statement of a witness introduced for impeachment purposes
may be considered by a jury as substantive evidence. Gelhaar v.
State (Wis. 1969).
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder for the
fatal stabbing of her husband. Within two hours of the -stabbing,
the defendant's two children made separate statements to police
officers concerning a conversation between the deceased and the
defendant at the time of the stabbing. At trial, the testimony of
the children was inconsistent with their earlier statements,' but
defense counsel failed to object2 to the prior statements' admis-
sion in evidence for their substantive value and the trial judge
did not instruct the jury that the prior statements were admissi-
ble only for impeachment purposes. The defendant moved for a
new trial on this basis, but the motion was denied. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed, holding that a jury
should be allowed to consider the prior inconsistent statements of
a witness as substantive evidence. Gelhaar v. State, 163 N.W.2d
609 (Wis. 1969).
Gelhaar constitutes a reversal of previous Wisconsin law3 and
a rejection of the almost universally accepted rule that prior in-
consistent statements by a witness cannot be considered as sub-
stantive evidence by a jury.4 The foundation of this so-called
orthodox view is that the inconsistent statements are hearsay.5
Although the rule that prior inconsistent statements of a wit-
ness may be considered also as substantive evidence has not been
accepted in most jurisdictions, such a rule has been advocated by
I. These earlier statements indicated premeditation on the part of the
defendant, while the testimony at the trial tended to show provocation by the
deceased and lack of premeditation by the defendant.
The court's decision may have been made easier by the fact that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to reach a guilty verdict even without consider-
ing the testimony of the children for its substantive value.
2. Although counsel failed to object, the Wisconsin Supreme Court evi-
dently did not consider the error waived, because they gave full consideration
to the matter on appeal. Counsel's failure to object did not seem to influence
the court in any manner in its decision.
3. E.g., State v. Major, 274 Wis. 110, 79 N.W.2d 75 (1956). Prior incon-
sistent statements were admissible only for impeachment purposes and could
not be considered as substantive evidence.
4. See, e.g., 58 Amt. Jua. Witnesses § 770 (1948); Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1454
(1941).
5. 3 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940). There are numerous
exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, but none fit the circumstances present in
Gelhaar. For a summary of these exceptions, see C. McCoRicx, THE LAw oF
EvmNcE §§ 230-299 (1954).
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the leading scholars in the field of evidence for nearly thirty
years. In his first treatise, Professor John Wigmore accepted the
rule that such statements are admissible for impeachment pur-
poses only.( In his later works, however, this orthodox view was
discarded. The reason given for this turnabout was that the in-
firmities of hearsay (the absence of a witness from the court-
room and thus, the inability to cross-examine him) are cured
when prior inconsistent statements are put in evidence in the pres-
ence of a declarant who may then be questioned. Since the pur-
pose of the hearsay rule is fulfilled, Wigmore concluded that the
orthodox rule should be abandoned under these circumstances.
7
Professor Charles McCormick is in accord with the later views
expressed by Wigmore.8 In addition, McCormick contended that
the instructions of the judge to the jury to consider the inconsis-
tent statement for its impeachment value only has little or no ef-
fect on the minds of jurors. Since the jury naturally finds it too
difficult to carry out these instructions, the prior statements are
considered for substantive purposes anyway and the instructions,
become a mere formality.9 Thus McCormick concluded that the
orthodox rule did not serve the purpose it was said to serve, and
he advocated in part the rule now adopted by the Gelhaar
court:10
A statement made on a former occasion by a declarant
having an opportunity to observe the facts stated, will
be received as evidence of such facts, notwithstanding
the rule against hearsay if
(1) the statement is proved to have been written or
signed by the declarant, or to have been given by him as
testimony in a judicial or official hearing, or the making
of the statement is acknowledged by the declarant in his
testimony in the present proceeding, and
(2) the party against whom the statement is offered
is afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the declar-
ant, and
6. 3 J. WIGBIORE, EVIDENCE § 1018, at 688 n.2 (3d ed. 1940). Citation to
Wigmore's earlier work is not available.
7. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (3d ed. 1940).
8. See C. McConmicx, THE LAW op EVIDENCE § 39 (1954).
9. Id. at 77 (1954). McCormick verified his conclusions on the basis of
questionnaires sent to various judges.
10. Id. at 82. The rule proposed by McCormick does not include part 3 of
the rule set out by the court in Gelhaar.
[Vol. 22
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(3) the witness has testified to the same events in a
contrary manner in the present proceedings.1
The Model Code of Evidence12 adopted the view of Wigmore
and McCormick. The Code and McCormick, however, went
further than Wigmore and advocated the extension of the new
rule to prior consistent statements.' s The Gelhaar court, how-
ever, expressly rejected the admission of prior consistent state-
ments:
We do not feel that self-serving statements have the
same evidentary value as prior inconsistent statements.
Moreover, a witness will have already testified to the
matters contained in a prior consistent statement. There-
fore the evidence is before the jury as evidence already.14
Despite the strong advocacy for change, only one jurisdiction,
prior to Gellwzra, has rejected the orthodox rule.15 The logic of
the scholars never seemed able to prevail among practitioners and
judges. In State v. Saporen,'6 the Minnesota Supreme Court gave
one of the better arguments for adhering to the orthodox rule.
The Saporen court believed that the oath and the right to cross-
examination ought to be in effect at the time of the making of
any statements to be introduced in evidence, or else the truth-
finding process would be put in jeopardy due to a temptation to
manufacture testimony.' 7 Whether the GelUvar decision is a
signal that jurisdictions which have followed the orthodox rule
have now begun to retreat from it remains to be seen. Since the
new rule has been accepted only once before, it would seem that
this is doubtful.
11. 163 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1969). The court's purpose in adding part 3 was
to limit the substantive use of these statements to potential impeachment situa-
tions only.
12. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503 (1942). This rule states in part:
"Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible if the judge finds that the
declarant ... (b) is present and subject to cross-examination." The Code's
ready adoption of this minority view may be explained by the fact that Wig-
more was advisor to the drafters.
13. See C. McComicx, THE LAw OF EvIDENcE § 39 (1954); MODEL CODE
OF EvIDENCE rule 503 (1942). In situations involving prior consistent state-
ments, a party is trying to introduce his own prior statements to show that
they are unchanged. Prior inconsistent statements, on the other hand, concern
the introduction of statements of an opponent in an attempt to impeach his
testimony.
14. 163 N.W2d 609, 614 (Wis. 1969).
15. State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 116 P2d 686 (1941).
16. 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939).
17. Id. at , 285 N.W. at 900, 901. The possibility of manufacturing testi-
mony seems to be a weak reason for retaining the orthodox rule. If a witness
desired to manufacture testimony, such a rule or even the oath would not stop
him from doing so.
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South Carolina is in accord with the orthodox view I8 and there
is no indication of a change by its courts. However, since prior
inconsistent statements may be introduced for impeachment pur-
poses, according to the argument on behalf of the new rule - the
incapacity of the jury to follow instructions - South Carolina
juries may in fact be considering the testimony for its substantive
value.
ROBERT E. STATON
18. E.g., Squires v. Henderson, 208 S.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 738 (1946).
[Vol. 22
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Plea of Guilty - Failure of state
trial court to establish a record from which an appellate court
can determine the validity of a plea of guilty held reversible er-
ror. Boykin v. AZabama, (S. Ct. 1969).
The petitioner, at the recommendation of court-appointed
counsel, pleaded guilty to five counts of common law robbery and,
after a jury trial to determine punishment', was given the death
sentence pursuant to Alabama statute.2 Upon automatic appeal,
the Alabama Supreme Court rejected Boykin's claim that the
death sentence for common law robbery was cruel and unusual
punishment as prohibited by the Federal Constitution.4 Four
justices, however, one concurring specially and three dis-
senting, noted that the record "does not disclose that the defend-
ant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty." 5
Still protesting the harshness of the Alabama punishment statute,
the petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Without deciding the constitutional argument concerning punish-
ment,6 the Court ruled in favor of Boykin on the grounds sug-
gested by the four Alabama justices. A state trial judge must
establish a trial record adequate for an appellate court to deter-
mine whether an accused's plea of guilty is voluntarily and un-
derstandingly given. Boykinz v. Alabama, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969).
The guilty plea, its rendering and effect, has heretofore been
largely overlooked by the Supreme Court.7 Guilty pleas, how-
l. ALA. CODE tit 15, § 277 (1958) provides that the trial court must allow
the punishment to be determined by a jury.
2. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 415 (1958).
3. An automatic appeal in capital cases is provided by statute. ALA. CODE
tit. 15, § 382(10) (1958). This section has been interpreted as requiring the
appellate court to search the record to uncover any prejudicial error, even
though an appellant's counsel did not raise the issue in his brief. Lee v. State,
265 Ala. 623, 93 So. 2d 757 (1957).
4. Boykin v. State, 281 Ala. 659, 207 So. 2d 412 (1968).
5. Id. at 662, 207 So. 2d at 414.
6. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), has been interpreted as
applying the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment to the states by way of the fourteenth amendment However, the Supreme
Court has not recently reviewed the constitutionality of any state statute when
such statute prescribes a penalty not grossly disproportionate to the voluntary
criminal act or conduct prohibited by the statute. Indeed, the last major cases
to come before the Court on the issue of cruel and unusual punishment involved
"status" crimes such as drug addiction, Robinson v. California, supra, (held
to be cruel and unusual); and alcoholism, Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968), (not cruel and unusual punishment where an accused had a choice
between acting and not acting).
7. There have been few cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt spe-
cifically with the voluntariness of a plea of guilty. In Shelton v. United States,
356 U.S. 26 (1958), the Court apparently avoided that issue. The circuit court
had upheld Shelton's guilty plea although two of the five circuit judges sitting
en banc had dissented vigorously. 246 F.2d 571 (5 Cir. 1957). Upon appeal, the
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ever, account for some eighty-two per cent of all federal court
verdicts, 8 and the percentage may be somewhat higher in state
court systems with their overloaded criminal dockets.9 In 1966,
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure recommended a change in Rule 11 which gave more ex-
plicit instructions to a federal trial judge as to what would be re-
quired for a guilty plea to be accepted as valid. This amended
rule was adopted and became effective July 1, 1966.10 Thus, for
the first time, district judges had to address a defendant person-
ally to determine whether his plea was voluntary and made with
an understanding of the consequences of the plea. The judge also
had to satisfy himself that there was a factual basis for the plea.
Further, the trial court record must reflect all of these findings.
The mandate of this rule was probably one factor which drew the
attention of the Supreme Court to the important role that guilty
pleas play in the administration of criminal justice and the abuses
to which such pleas might be subjected. In April 1969, in Mc-
Carthy v. United States," a decision which purported to be an
interpretation of Rule 11 for application only in federal courts,
the Court said that a federal judge had an affirmative duty to
establish a record of interrogation of the defendant in order to
insure that he had made his plea of guilty in a manner which sat-
isfied the requirements of Rule 11. In May, in Halliday v. United
States,12 a per ouiam decision refused to apply Rule 11 retroac-
tively on the grounds that a constitutionally valid guilty plea
could be obtained without rigid adherence to the procedures pre-
scribed by the rule. At this point, then, Boykin came before the
Court.
Supreme Court reversed and remanded in a memorandum opinion which stated
that "[u]pon the consideration of the entire record and confession of error by
the Solicitor General that the plea of guilty may have been improperly ob-
tained". The states have been allowed much flexibility in devising procedures
for the acceptance of guilty pleas.
8. McCarthy v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1169 n. 7 (1969).
9. At the state level, guilty pleas are a necessity. Without such pleas, which
avoid the formality of a trial, local courts would be forced to hear so many
cases that the efficient administration of criminal justice would be impeded.
10. FEDFRAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 provides:
A defendant may plead . . . guilty. . . . The court may refuse
to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea .. . with-
out first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea . . . . The court shall not
enter judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there
is a factual basis for the plea. (Amended portions emphasized.)
11. 89 S.Ct. 1166 (1969).
12. 89 S.Ct. 1498 (1969).
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In oral argument, the issue of cruel and unusual punishment
was stressed but counsel for the petitioner made mention of the
failure of the record to show that his client had entered his plea
voluntarily and understandingly. Justice Douglas focused upon
this second proposition and stated in the majority opinion that
"the dissenting justices in the Alabama Supreme Court stated the
law accurately when they concluded that there was reversible er-
ror 'because the record does not disclose that the defendant volun-
tarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty."' 13 A
guilty plea, he continued, is much more potent in effect than a
confession, for it ends the adversary proceeding in a criminal
case and leaves only the punishment for determination. Further-
more, three important constitutional rights are affected when one
enters a plea of guilty - the fifth amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, and the sixth amendment rights
to trial by jury and to confront one's accusers. All of these rights
have been preserved for state citizens by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.14 Therefore, the guilty plea is a
waiver of federally-protected rights, he reasoned, and such a
waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record.
Justices Harlan and Black dissented, objecting that the mere
inadequacy of the record was not sufficient grounds for reversing
when the petitioner never questioned the voluntariness of his
guilty plea in the lower court.15 The dissenting justices further
complained that the majority decision was without precedent and
that it in effect required state courts to adhere to Federal Rule
11. This conclusion is not without merit. Mcarthy'6 was an in-
terpretation of Rule 11 for application in federal courts. Thus,
McCarthy should have had no controlling influence in Boykin,
even though the majority quoted extensively from it. Moreover,
13. 89 S.Ct. at 1713.
14. These rights were held applicable to the states by virtue of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965), respectively.
15. The majority justified their hearing of the issue on grounds that the
Alabama statute (note 3, supra) authorized the state supreme court to review
any prejudicial error, whether or not it was presented by counsel for the peti-
tioner. Furthermore, the majority urged, four Alabama justices had raised the
question of the adequacy of the trial record.
16. 89 S.Ct. 1166 (1969). The petitioner here pleaded guilty to several counts
of "wilfully and knowingly" attempting to evade the payment of taxes. There
was a record showing that the judge asked the accused if he understood the
nature of his plea and if he gave it voluntarily. Still, the Court found that the
judge had not complied fully with Rule 11 (see note 10, supra).
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Halliday,17 decided after HeCarthy, held that a constitutionally
valid guilty plea could be obtained in federal courts without strict
application of Rule 11. The petitioner's conviction was allowed
to stand in Halliday despite the lack of a record. If Halliday's
guilty plea could be valid without a record, why not Boykin's?
Justices Harlan and Black could not resolve this inconsistency
and suggested that Boykin made fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess more demanding than fifth amendment due process.
Since there was no record of the facts surrounding Boykin's
pleas of guilty, there was no reason for the majority to
decide what would constitute voluntariness and understand-
ing in the rendering of guilty pleas in state courts. Having
equated a plea of guilty to the waiver of federal constitutional
rights, Justice Douglas stated somewhat broadly that federal
standards must determine whether the waiver would be effec-
tive.'8 This statement gives some weight to the dissenting jus-
tices' suspicion that Boykin., in effect, requires state courts to ad-
here to Rule 11.19 In McCarthy, Chief Justice Warren had noted
that a plea of guilty necessarily caused the accused to waive sev-
eral constitutional rights20 - the same observation which Justice
Douglas made in Boykin.21 It is not overly speculative to suggest,
therefore, that when the proper factual situation comes before the
Court, the full protection of Rule 11 as to the scope of a trial
judge's inquiry may be extended to the states.22
Will it be sufficient simply to ask the defendant if he under-
stands the plea and makes it voluntarily? 23 To what extent will
the trial court's subjective judgments be accepted? These points
are left unanswered by the majority. Ignorance, incomprehen-
sion, terror, coercion, inducements as well as subtle or blatant
threats are listed as considerations in determining the voluntari-
ness of a guilty plea. The courts have spent many years, however,
attempting to define the nebulous concept of voluntariness. It
17. 89 S.Ct. 1498 (1969).
18. 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
19. Id. at 1713 (dissenting opinion).
20. 89 S.Ct. at 1171.
21. 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
22. See note 14, supra. These cases concluded that a federal standard would
govern the protection of a state citizen's rights as provided for by the re-
spective amendments to the Federal Constitution. When a federal standard is
applied to the states, the relevant body of federal case law becomes controlling
in state proceedings involving that right. Therefore, if a guilty plea conclusively
involves the waiver of federal rights which are governed by federal standards,
McCarthy may be already applicable to the states.
23. This was not sufficient in McCarthy.
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would therefore appear that Rule 11 may be in fact a useful guide
for state judges in ascertaining the validity of a guilty plea.
In its attempt to protect more rigidly the constitutional rights
of state citizens while providing a more complete record for ap-
pellate courts, Boykin virtually up-ended state criminal procedure
as it related to trial records validating a guilty plea.24 Hereto-
fore, only six states required a judge to demonstrate affirma-
tively on the record the validity of a plea of guilty.25 Yet the full
ramification of this line of cases cannot be known until the Su-
preme Court decides the extent to which a state judge must go in
determining satisfactorily whether a guilty plea is valid.26 It is
obvious that more than a mere surface inquiry will be expected.
JosErH T. MoELvEEw, Jit.
24. In McCarthy, the Court stated that guilty pleas were often subject to
frivolous post-conviction attacks. The Boykin holding will at least provide a
more complete record which will leave less doubt as to what occurred at trials
below. Complaints without merit may be more quickly disposed of, thus saving
time at the appellate level.
25. Colorado and Illinois require such a record by statute. Case law in
Missouri, New York, Wisconsin, and Washington requires that the record
show the validity of a guilty plea. Boykin v. Alabama, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 n. 6
(1969).
26. Boykin and its potential offspring overshadow a leading South Carolina
case on guilty pleas, Thompson v. State, 248 S.C. 475, 151 S.E.2d 221 (1966),
noted in 19 S.C.L. REv. 261 (1967), which held that when an accused is repre-
sented by counsel who has informed him of the consequences of a plea of
guilty, failure of the court to admonish the accused concerning such conse-
quences was not prejudicial error. In Dixon v. State, Opinion No. 18937 (S.C.,
filed July 3, 1969), however, the state supreme court reversed and remanded
where an accused questioned the validity of his guilty plea, because "[u]nder
all of the circumstances reflected by the record, we are of the view that Dixon
did not intelligently and understandingly enter the several guilty pleas." In
that case, the court noted that the petitioner's counsel was not present at the
time that his pleas were entered.
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